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Abstract
This paper studies efficient risk-sharing rules for the concave dom-
inance order. For a univariate risk, it follows from a comonotone
dominance principle, due to Landsberger and Meilijson [27], that effi-
ciency is characterized by a comonotonicity condition. The goal of the
paper is to generalize the comonotone dominance principle as well as
the equivalence between efficiency and comonotonicity to the multi-
dimensional case. The multivariate case is more involved (in particular
because there is no immediate extension of the notion of comonotonic-
ity), and it is addressed by using techniques from convex duality and
optimal transportation.
Keywords: concave order, stochastic dominance, comonotonicity, effi-
ciency, multivariate risk-sharing.
1 Introduction
Motivation. The aim of this paper is to study Pareto efficient allocations
of risky consumptions of multiple goods in a contingent exchange economy.
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In this framework, consumption goods are imperfect substitutes, hence con-
sumption is measured along several different units, instead of being denom-
inated in one single monetary value. These units can be for instance ma-
terial consumption and labor, or future consumptions at various subsequent
dates, or currency units with limited exchangeability. In this setting, risky
consumption can no longer be represented as a random variable, but as a
random vector.
Agents are assumed to have incomplete preferences associated with the
concave order : a risk (random vector) X is preferred to a risk Y in the con-
cave order whenever every risk-averse expected utility decision-maker prefers
X to Y . Again, these preferences form an incomplete order, hence this as-
sumption (and its empirical content) may appear as relatively weak. We
shall see, however, that they in fact lead to strong predictions.
The motivation of the paper is to characterize efficient allocations for
the concave order on observable data (for instance, insurance contracts). In
the case of univariate risk, it is known that efficiency for the concave order
is equivalent to efficiency for some strictly concave expected utility model,
which in turn yields a tractable characterization of efficiency: comonotonic-
ity of the allocations. Allocations are comonotone whenever each agent’s
contingent consumption is a nondecreasing function of the aggregate con-
sumption. Further, a comonotone dominance principle can also be proven:
if some initial allocation is not comonotone, there is a comonotone alloca-
tion such that every agent weakly prefers their contingent consumption in
the new allocation (at least one preferring strictly). Comonotonicity fully
characterizes efficiency and it is a testable and tractable property. Moreover,
as a consequence of the comonotone dominance principle, attention may be
restricted to the set of comonotone allocations, which is convex and almost
compact. Hence existence results may be obtained for many risk-sharing
problems (see for instance [26] in the framework of risk measures, or [9], [10]
for classes of law invariant and concave utilities).
Main results. This paper is devoted to the extension of the comonotone
dominance result and its application to the characterization of efficient allo-
cations in the multivariate setting. To this end, a definition of comonotonicity
for the multivariate case is first needed. Roughly speaking, according to the
definition of multivariate comonotonicity we adopt, an allocation (X1, ..., Xp)
(with each Xi being random vectors) is comonotone if it is efficient for some
strictly concave expected utility model. By first order conditions, this im-
plies that there is a random vector Z and convex functions ϕi such that
Xi = ∇ϕi(Z), where ∇ϕi is the gradient map of ϕi. This is the definition of
multivariate comonotonicity used by Ekeland, Galichon and Henry in [20].
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The comonotone dominance principle is next extended by solving a varia-
tional problem. More precisely, given an initial allocation and a collection
of strictly concave utility functions, we maximize the sum of these utilities
among allocations that dominate the initial allocation. We prove, and this
is the hard part of the proof, that the corresponding optimal allocation is
necessarily comonotone. The precise statement of the multivariate comono-
tone dominance result is, however more complicated than in the univariate
case since it requires the use of weak closures and a concept slightly stronger
than strict convexity. This follows from the fact that the set of multivari-
ate comonotone allocations is neither convex nor compact (even up to con-
stants), contrary to the univariate case (counterexamples are given). Finally
one may wonder whether the equivalence between efficient and comonotone
allocations is preserved in the multivariate case. The answer is yes, up to
some (interesting) technicalities. Again the precise statement of the result is
more complicated than in the univariate case. When applied to the univari-
ate case, our proof of the comonotone dominance result improves upon all
existing proofs (see [27], [14] and [30]). Indeed, it addresses directly the case
of many agents, it uses neither the discrete case nor a limiting argument, and
no hypotheses need be made on the aggregate endowment.
Literature overview. There is a distinguished tradition in modeling
preferences by concave dominance. Introduced in economics by Rothschild
and Stiglitz [34], the concave order has then been used in a wide variety of
economic contexts. To give a few references, let us mention efficiency pricing
(Peleg and Yaari [32], Chew and Zilcha [12]), measurement of inequality
(Atkinson [3]), and finance (Dybvig [16], Jouini and Kallal [25]).
In dimension one, the mutuality principle arose in the early work of Borch
[6], Arrow [1], [2] and Wilson [38]; see also LeRoy and Werner [28]. Lands-
berger and Meilijson [27] proved (for two agents and a discrete setting) that
any allocation of a given aggregate risk is dominated in the sense of concave
dominance by a comonotone allocation. This comonotone dominance prin-
ciple has been extended to the continuous case by limiting arguments (see
[14] and [30]). It implies the comonotonicity of efficient allocations for the
concave order. The equivalence between comonotonicity and efficiency was
only proved recently by Dana [13] for the discrete case and by Dana and
Meilijson [14] for the continuous case. This equivalence stimulated a line of
research on comonotonicity in the insurance and finance literature, see for
instance Jouini and Napp [23], [24]. On the empirical side, Townsend [37]
proposed to test whether the mutuality principle holds in three poor villages
in southern India while Attanasio and Davis ([4]) worked with US labor data.
The general findings of these empirical studies is that comonotonicity can be
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usually strongly rejected. A possible explanation of why efficiency is usually
not observed in the data is that the aforementioned literature only considers
risk-sharing in the case of one good (monetary consumption) and does not
take into account the cross-subsidy effects between several risky goods which
are only imperfect substitutes. Other papers, such as Brown and Matzkin
([8]) have tried to test whether observed market data on prices, aggregate
endowments and individual incomes satisfy the restrictions that are imposed
by Walrasian equilibrium. In contrast to this approach, we do not assume
prices to be available to the researcher.
The notion of multivariate comonotonicity adopted in this paper coin-
cides (up to some technical details) with the one originally introduced by
Ekeland, Galichon and Henry in [20] under the name µ-comonotonicity, in
the context of risk measures. Galichon and Henry use that concept to gen-
eralize rank-dependent expected utility in [19]. Other proposals for multi-
variate comonotonicity exist and are reviewed e.g. in [33]; however they do
not seem to be related to efficient risk-sharing. While the results of [20]
are strongly related to maximal correlation functionals and to the quadratic
optimal transportation problem (and in particular Brenier’s seminal paper
[7]), the present approach will rely on a slightly different optimization prob-
lem that has some familiarities with the multi-marginals optimal transport
problem of Gangbo and S´wie¸ch [22].
Organization of the paper. The paper is organized as follows. Section
2 recalls some definitions and various characterizations of comonotonicity in
the univariate case. Section 3 revisits the comonotone dominance principle of
[27] and characterizes efficient risk sharing in the univariate case. A notion
of multivariate comonotonicity is introduced in Section 4, an analogue of
the comonotone dominance principle is stated, and efficient sharing-rules
are characterized as the weak closure of comonotone allocations. Section 5
concludes the paper. Proofs are gathered in section 6.
2 Preliminaries
Given as primitive is a probability space (Ω,F ,P). For every (univariate or
multivariate) random vector X on such space, the law of X is denoted L(X).
Two random vectors X and Y are called equivalent in distribution (denoted
X ∼ Y ), if L(X) = L(Y ).
Definition 2.1. Let X and Y be bounded random vectors with values in Rd,
then X dominates Y for the concave order, denoted X < Y , if and only if
E(ϕ(X)) ≤ E(ϕ(Y )) for every convex function ϕ : Rd → R. If, in addition,
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E(ϕ(X)) < E(ϕ(Y )) for some convex function ϕ, then X is said to dominate
Y strictly.
As the paper makes extensive use of convex analysis (Legendre trans-
forms, infimal convolutions, convex duality), the concave order is defined
here in terms of convex loss functions while usually defined with concave
utilities. Clearly the definition above coincides with the standard one. As
X < Y implies that E(X) = E(Y ), comparing risks for < only makes sense
for random vectors with the same mean. We refer to Rothschild and Stiglitz
[34] and Fo¨llmer and Schied [21] for various characterizations of concave
dominance in the univariate case and to Mu¨ller and Stoyan [31] for the mul-
tivariate case. Using a classical result of Cartier, Fell and Meyer (see [11] or
[36]), one deduces a convenient characterization (see section 6 for a proof) of
strict dominance as follows:
Lemma 2.2. Let X and Y be bounded random vectors with values in Rd,
then the following statements are equivalent:
1. X strictly dominates Y ,
2. X < Y and L(X) 6= L(Y ),
3. X < Y and for every strictly convex function ϕ, E(ϕ(X)) < E(ϕ(Y )).
Given X ∈ L∞(Ω,Rd), a random vector of aggregate risk of dimension
d ≥ 1, the set of admissible allocations or risk-sharing of X among p agents
is denoted A(X):
A(X) := {Y = (Y1, ..., Yp) ∈ L∞(Ω,Rd) :
p∑
i=1
Yi = X}.
For simplicity, the dependence of A(X) on the number p of agents does not
appear explicitly. A concept of dominance for allocations of X is defined
next.
Definition 2.3. For d ≥ 1, let X = (X1, ..., Xp) and Y := (Y1, ..., Yp) be in
A(X). Then X is said to dominate Y if Xi < Yi for every i ∈ {1, ..., p}.
If, in addition, there is an i ∈ {1, ..., p} such that Xi strictly dominates Yi,
then X is said to strictly dominate Y. An allocation X ∈ A(X) is Pareto-
efficient (for the concave order) if there is no allocation in A(X) that strictly
dominates X.
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It may easily be verified that dominance of allocations can also be defined
as follows. Let X and Y be in A(X), then X dominates Y if and only if
E(
p∑
i=1
ϕi(Xi)) ≤ E(
p∑
i=1
ϕi(Yi)), (2.1)
for every collection of convex functions ϕi : R
d → R. Moreover, X strictly
dominates Y if and only if the previous inequality is strict for some collection
of convex functions ϕi : R
d → R . Note that from lemma 2.2, it is equivalent
to require that the inequality is strict for every collection of strictly convex
functions. Therefore, if X is the solution of the problem
inf
{ p∑
i=1
E(ϕi(Yi)) : (Y1, ..., Yp) ∈ A(X)
}
(2.2)
for some collection of strictly convex functions ϕi, then X is efficient. Finally,
recall that in the univariate case, comonotonicity is defined by:
Definition 2.4. A collection (X1, ..., Xp) of p real-valued random variables
on (Ω,F ,P) is comonotone if for every (i, j) ∈ {1, ..., p}2,
(Xi(ω
′)−Xi(ω))(Xj(ω′)−Xj(ω)) ≥ 0 for P⊗ P-a.e. (ω, ω′) ∈ Ω2.
It is well-known that comonotonicity of (X1, ..., Xp) is equivalent to the
fact that each Xi can be written as a nondecreasing function of the sum
X =
∑
iXi (see for instance Denneberg [15]). Therefore (X1, ..., Xp) is
comonotone if and only if there are nondecreasing functions fi summing
to the identity such that Xi = fi(X). Note that the functions fi are all
1-Lipschitz . The extension of this notion to the multivariate case (i.e when
each Xi is R
d-valued) is not immediately obvious and will be addressed in
Section 4.
We now provide another characterization of comonotonicity based on the
notion of maximal correlation. From now on, assume that the underlying
probability space (Ω,F ,P) is non-atomic which means that there is no A ∈ F
such that for every B ∈ F if P(B) < P(A) then P(B) = 0. It is well-known
that (Ω,F ,P) is non-atomic if and only if a random variable that is uniformly
distributed on [0, 1], which is denoted U ∼ U ([0, 1]), can be constructed on
(Ω,F ,P). Let Z ∈ L1(Ω,F ,P), and define for every X ∈ L∞(Ω,F ,P), both
Z and X being univariate here, the maximal correlation functional:
̺Z(X) := sup
X˜∼X
E(ZX˜) = sup
Z˜∼Z
E(Z˜X) = sup
Z˜∼Z, X˜∼X
E(Z˜X˜). (2.3)
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The functional ̺Z has extensively been discussed in economics and in finance,
therefore only a few useful facts are recalled. Let F−1X be the quantile function
of X , that is the pseudo-inverse of distribution function FX . From Hardy-
Littlewood’s inequality, one has
̺Z(X) =
∫ 1
0
F−1X (t)F
−1
Z (t)dt,
and the supremum in (2.3) is achieved by any pair (Z˜, X˜) of comonotone ran-
dom variables (F−1Z (U), F
−1
X (U)) for U uniformly distributed. By symmetry,
one can either fix Z or fixX . Fixing for instance Z, the supremum is achieved
by F−1X (U) where U ∼ U ([0, 1]) and Z = F−1Z (U). When Z is non-atomic,
there is a unique U = FZ(Z) such that Z = F
−1
Z (U), and the supremum is
uniquely attained by the non-decreasing function of Z, F−1X ◦ FZ(Z):
̺Z(X) = E(ZF
−1
X ◦ FZ(Z)). (2.4)
Also note that ̺Z is subadditive: ̺Z(
∑
iXi) ≤
∑
i ̺Z(Xi).
Proposition 2.5. Let (X1, ..., Xp) be in L
∞(Ω,F ,P). The following asser-
tions are equivalent:
1. (X1, ..., Xp) are comonotone,
2. for any non-atomic Z ∈ L1(Ω,F ,P),
̺Z
(∑
i
Xi
)
=
∑
i
̺Z (Xi) , (2.5)
3. for some non-atomic Z ∈ L1(Ω,F ,P), (2.5) holds true.
Proof. For the sake of simplicity, we restrict ourselves to p = 2 and set
(X1, X2) = (X, Y ). Point 1 implies point 2 since F
−1
X+Y = F
−1
X + F
−1
Y for
comonotone X and Y . To show that point 3 implies point 1, assume that
for some non-atomic Z, one has (2.5), which by sublinearity is equivalent to
̺Z(X + Y ) ≥ ̺Z(X) + ̺Z(Y ). Let ZX+Y (resp. ZX and ZY ) be distributed
as Z and solve supZ˜∼Z E(Z˜X) (resp. ̺Z(X) and ̺Z(Y )). One then has:
E(ZX+Y (X + Y )) ≥ E(ZXX) + E(ZY Y ).
As E(ZX+YX) ≤ E(ZXX) and E(ZX+Y Y ) ≤ E(ZY Y ), it follows E(ZX+YX) =
E(ZXX) = ̺Z(X) and E(ZX+Y Y ) = E(ZY Y ) = ̺Z(Y ), hence from (2.4),
X = F−1X ◦ FZX+Y (ZX+Y )) and Y = F−1Y ◦ FZX+Y (ZX+Y )), proving comono-
tonicity.
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Proposition 2.5 was the starting point of Ekeland, Galichon and Henry
[20] for providing a multivariate generalization of the concept of comono-
tonicity. In the sequel we shall further discuss this multivariate extension
and compare it with the one proposed in the present paper.
3 The univariate case
A landmark result, due to Landsberger and Meilijson [27] states that any
allocation is dominated by a comonotone one. The original proof was given
in the discrete case for two agents, and the results were extended to the
general case by approximation. We give an alternative proof in the Appendix
based on the same approach we shall use in the multidimensional case. This
proof is based on a certain optimization problem; we believe that, even in
the unidimensional case, it is of interest per se since it does not require
approximation arguments and slightly improves on the original statement
by proving strict dominance of non-comonotone allocations. Contrary to
Landsberger and Meilijson, one needs however to assume, as before, that the
probability space (Ω,F ,P) is non-atomic.
Theorem 3.1. Let X be a bounded real-valued random variable on the non-
atomic probability space (Ω,F ,P), and let X = (X1, ..., Xp) ∈ A(X) be an
allocation. There exists a comonotone allocation in A(X) that dominates X.
Moreover, if X is not comonotone, then there exists an allocation that strictly
dominates X.
As an application, we have:
Theorem 3.2. Let X be a bounded real-valued random variable on the non-
atomic probability space (Ω,F ,P) and let X = (X1, ..., Xp) ∈ A(X). Then
the following statements are equivalent:
1. X is efficient,
2. X is comonotone,
3. there exist continuous and strictly convex functions (ψ1, ..., ψp) such
that X solves
inf{
p∑
i=1
E(ψi(Yi)) :
p∑
i=1
Yi = X}.
Proof. Point 1 implies point 2: the comonotonicity of efficient allocations
of X follows directly from Theorem 3.1. Point 2 implies point 3: if X =
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(X1, ..., Xp) is comonotone, let us write Xi = fi(X) for some nondecreasing
and 1-Lipschitz functions fi: [m,M ] → R (with M := EsssupX , m :=
EssinfX) summing up to the identity map. Extending the fi functions by
fi(x) = fi(M) + (x − M)/p for x ≥ M and fi(x) = fi(m) + (x − m)/p
for x ≤ m, one gets 1-Lipschitz nondecreasing functions summing up to the
identity everywhere. Let ϕ(x) :=
∫ x
0
fi(s)ds for every x. The functions ϕi
are convex and C1,1 (i.e. C1 with a Lipschitz continuous derivative) and
have quadratic growth at ∞. The convex conjugates1 ψi := ϕ∗i are strictly
convex and continuous functions, and by construction, one has for every i,
X ∈ ∂ψi(Xi) a.s., which implies that (X1, ..., Xp) minimizes E(
∑
i ψi(Yi))
subject to
∑
i Yi = X , which proves point 3. Point 3 implies point 1 since
the ψi functions are strictly convex; if (X1, ..., Xp) satisfies point 3 then it is
an efficient allocation of X .
Corollary 3.3. Let (Ω,F ,P) be non-atomic, then the set of efficient alloca-
tions of X is convex and compact in L∞ up to zero-sum translations (which
means that it can be written as {(λ1, ..., λp) :
∑p
i=1 λi = 0} + A0 with A0
compact in L∞). In particular, the set of efficient allocations of X is closed
in L∞.
Proof. Let M := EsssupX , m := EssinfX and define K0 as the set of
functions (f1, ..., fp) ∈ C([m,M ],Rp) such that for each nondecreasing fi,
fi(m) = m/p and
∑p
i=1 fi(x) = x for every x ∈ [m,M ], and let
K := K0 + {(λ1, ..., λp) :
p∑
i=1
λi = 0}.
The convexity claim thus follows from theorem 3.2 and the convexity of K.
Let us remark that elements of K0 have 1-Lipschitz components and are
bounded. The compactness of K in C([m,M ],Rp) then follows from Ascoli’s
theorem. The compactness and closedness claims directly follow.
Convexity and compactness of efficient allocations are quite remarkable
features and as will be shown later, they are no longer true in the multivariate
case. Note also that efficient allocations are regular: they are 1-Lipschitz
functions of aggregate risk.
1Let us recall that the Legendre transform or convex conjugate of ϕi is by definition
given by ϕ∗i (x) := supy{x · y − ϕi(y)}.
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4 The multivariate case
The aim of this section is to generalize to the multivariate case the results
obtained in the univariate case. More particularly, Landsberger and Meil-
ijson’s comonotone dominance principle are extended: 1) any allocation is
dominated by a comonotone allocation; 2) any non comonotone allocation is
strictly dominated by a comonotone one.
When addressing these generalizations it is not immediately clear what
is the appropriate notion of comonotonicity in the multivariate framework.
Let us informally give an intuitive presentation of the approach developed
in the following paragraphs. A natural generalization of monotone maps in
several dimensions is given by subgradients of convex functions. It is there-
fore tempting to say that an allocation (X1, ..., Xp) ∈ A(X) is comonotone
whenever there is a common random vector Z (interpreted as a price) and
convex functions ϕi (interpreted as individual costs) such that Xi ∈ ∂ϕi(Z)
a.s. for every i. Formally, this is nothing but the optimality condition for
the risk-sharing or infimal convolution problem
inf
X∈A(X)
p∑
i=1
E(ψi(Xi)), (4.1)
where ψi = ϕ
∗
i (the Legendre Transform of ϕi). This suggests a definition of
comonotone allocations as the allocations that solve a risk-sharing problem of
the type above. This has a natural interpretation in terms of risk-sharing, but
one has to be cautious about such a definition whenever the ψi functions are
degenerate2. Indeed, if all the ψi functions are constant, then any allocation
is comonotone in that sense! This means that one has to impose strict con-
vexity in the definition. We shall actually go one step further in quantifying
strict convexity as follows. Given an arbitrary collection w = (w1, ..., wp) of
strictly convex functions, we will say that an allocation is w-strictly comono-
tone whenever it solves a risk-sharing problem of the form (4.1) for some ψi
functions which are more convex than the wi (i.e. ψi−wi is convex for every
i). Allocations which can be approached (in law) by strictly w-comonotone
will be called comonotone. Since they solve a strictly convex risk-sharing
problem, w-strictly comonotone allocations are efficient and the main goal
of this section will be to generalize the univariate comonotone dominance
result. We shall indeed prove that for any allocation X ∈ A(X) and any
2In the univariate case, the situation is much simpler since one can take Z = X , and
since the Xi variables sum up to X , each convex function ϕi has to be differentiable i.e.
all the ψi necessarily are strictly convex. In other words, degeneracies can be ruled out
easily in the univariate case.
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choice of w, there is a w-comonotone allocation Y ∈ A(X) that dominates
X (strictly whenever X is not itself w-comonotone). The full proof is detailed
in Section 6, but its starting point is quite intuitive and consists of studying
the optimization problem:
inf
{ p∑
i=1
E(wi(Yi)) : (Y1, ..., Yp) ∈ A(X), Yi < Xi, i = 1, ..., p
}
. (4.2)
Clearly, the solution Y of (4.2) dominates X. A careful study of the dual of
(4.2) will enable us to prove that Y is necessarily w-comonotone, thus giving
the desired multivariate extension of Landsberger and Meilijson’s comono-
tone dominance principle. Note also, that our proof is constructive since it
relies on an explicit (although difficult to solve in practice) convex minimiza-
tion problem.
This section is organized as follows. In paragraph 4.1, we shall refor-
mulate the problem in terms of joint laws rather than random allocations.
This is purely technical but will enable us to gain some linearity and some
compactness in (4.2). We then define precisely our concepts of multivari-
ate comonotonicity in paragraph 4.2. Paragraph 4.3 states the multivariate
comonotone dominance result, i.e. the multivariate generalization of Lands-
berger and Meilijson’s results. Finally, in paragraph 4.4, we gather several
remarks on multivariate comonotonicity and emphasize some important qual-
itative differences between the univariate and multivariate cases.
4.1 From random vectors to joint laws
From now on, it is assumed that the underlying probability space (Ω,F ,P)
is non-atomic, that there are p agents and that risk is d-dimensional. X is
a given Rd-valued L∞ random vector modeling an aggregate random multi-
variate risk, while X = (X1, ...., Xp) is a given L
∞ sharing of X among the p
agents, that is
X =
p∑
i=1
Xi.
Let γ0 := L(X) be the joint law ofX andm0 := L(X). Let γ be a probability
measure on (Rd)p and γi denote its i-th marginal. Note that, L(Yi) is the
i-th marginal of L(Y). Let ΠΣγ be the probability measure on Rd defined
by
∫
Rd
ϕ(z)dΠΣγ(z) =
∫
Rd×p
ϕ(
p∑
i=1
xi)dγ(x1, ..., xp), ∀ϕ ∈ C0(Rd,R), (4.3)
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(where C0 denotes the space of continuous functions that tend to 0 at∞). It
follows from this definition that if γ = L(Y), then ΠΣγ = L(
∑
Yi). Hence,
if Y ∈ A(X) and γ = L(Y), then ΠΣγ = m0 = L(X). In other words, if
γ = L(Y) with Y ∈ A(X), then∫
ϕ(x1 + ...+ xd)dγ(x1, ..., xd) =
∫
ϕ(z)dm0(z), ∀ϕ ∈ C0(Rd,R). (4.4)
Since Y is bounded, γ is compactly supported. It follows from the next
lemma that {L(Y), Y ∈ A(X)} coincides with the set of compactly sup-
ported probability measures γ on (Rd)p that satisfy (4.4):
Lemma 4.1. Assume (Ω,F ,P) is non-atomic. If γ is a compactly supported
probability measure on (Rd)p and satisfies (4.4), then there exists a random
vector Y = (Y1, ..., Yp) ∈ A(X) such that L(Y) = γ. Hence {L(Y), Y ∈
A(X)} =M(m0), whereM(m0) is the set of compactly supported probability
measures on (Rd)p such that ΠΣγ = m0 = ΠΣγ0.
In the sequel, joint laws M(m0) will be used instead of admissible allo-
cations A(X). For compactness issues, a closed ball B ∈ Rd centered at 0
such that m0 is supported by B
p is chosen, and attention is restricted to the
set of elements ofM(m0) supported by pB (meaning that only risk-sharings
of X whose components take value in B will be considered). We thus define
MB(m0) := {γ ∈M(m0) : γ(Bp) = 1}.
4.2 Efficiency and comonotonicity in the multivariate
case
Let C be the cone of convex and continuous functions on B, dominance and
efficiency in terms of joint laws are defined as follows:
Definition 4.2. Let γ and π be in MB(m0), then γ dominates π whenever∫
Bp
p∑
i=1
ϕi(xi)dγ(x1, ..., xp) ≤
∫
Bp
p∑
i=1
ϕi(xi)dπ(x1, ..., xp) (4.5)
for all functions (ϕ1, ..., ϕp) ∈ Cp. If, in addition, inequality (4.5) is strict
whenever the ϕi functions are further assumed to be strictly convex, then γ is
said to dominate strictly π. The allocation γ ∈ MB(m0) is efficient if there
is no other allocation in MB(m0) that strictly dominates it.
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Given γ0 ∈ MB(m0), it is easy to check (taking functions ϕi(x) = |xi|n
in (4.5) and letting n → ∞) that any γ ∈ M(m0) dominating γ0 (without
the restriction that it is supported on Bp) actually belongs to MB(m0).
Hence the choice to only consider allocations supported by Bp is in fact not
restrictive. Indeed, if γ is supported by Bp, then efficiency of γ in the usual
sense, i.e. without restricting to competitors supported by Bp, is equivalent
to efficiency among competitors supported by Bp.
To define comonotonicity, let ψ := (ψ1, ..., ψp) be a family of strictly
convex continuous functions (defined on B). For any x ∈ pB, let us consider
the risk sharing (or infimal convolution) problem:
iψi(x) := inf
{
p∑
i=1
ψi(yi) : yi ∈ B,
p∑
i=1
yi = x
}
.
This problem admits a unique solution which will be denoted
Tψ(x) := (T
1
ψ(x), ..., T
p
ψ(x)).
Note that, by definition
p∑
i=1
T iψ(x) = x, ∀x ∈ pB. (4.6)
The map x 7→ Tψ(x) gives the optimal way to share x so as to minimize
the total cost when each individual cost is ψi. It defines the efficient allocation
Tψ(X) := (T
1
ψ(X), ..., T
p
ψ(X)) with joint law γψ defined by:∫
Bp
f(y1, ..., yp)dγψ(y) :=
∫
pB
f(Tψ(x))dm0(x)
for any f ∈ C(Bp). One then defines comonotonicity as follows:
Definition 4.3. An allocation γ ∈ MB(m0) is strictly comonotone if there
exists a family ψ := (ψ1, ..., ψp) of strictly convex continuous functions such
that γ = γψ. Given a family w := (w1, ..., wp) of strictly convex functions in
C1(B), an allocation γ ∈MB(m0) is w-strictly comonotone if there exists a
family ψ := (ψ1, ..., ψp) of convex continuous functions such that ψi−wi ∈ C
for every i and γ = γψ.
We shall soon show that strictly comonotone random vectors are in the
image of monotone operators (subgradients of convex functions), evaluated
at the same random vector, p(X), which justifies the terminology “comono-
tonicity” in the multivariate setting. By definition, any strictly comonotone
allocation is efficient. As the set of strictly comonotone allocations is not
closed, we are led to introduce another definition.
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Definition 4.4. An allocation γ ∈ MB(m0) is comonotone if there exists
a sequence of strictly comonotone allocations that weakly star converges to
γ. Given a family w := (w1, ..., wp) of strictly convex functions in C
1(B),
an allocation γ ∈ MB(m0) is w-comonotone, if there exists a sequence of
w-strictly comonotone allocations that weakly star converges to γ.
Definitions 4.3 and 4.4 will be discussed in more detail in paragraph 4.4.
To understand the previous notions of comonotonicity and in particular why
these allocations are called comonotone, it is important to understand the
structure of the Tψ maps.
Let us first ignore regularity issues and further assume that the ψi func-
tions are smooth as well as ψ∗i their Legendre transforms. Without the
constraints xi ∈ B, then the optimality conditions imply that there is some
multiplier p = p(x) such that
∇ψi(T iψ(x)) = p, hence, T iψ(x) = ∇ψ∗i (p).
Using (4.6), one gets
x =
p∑
j=1
∇ψ∗j (p), hence, p = ∇(
p∑
j=1
ψ∗j )
∗(x),
thus,
T iψ(x) = ∇ψ∗i
(
∇(
p∑
j=1
ψ∗j )
∗(x)
)
.
The maps T iψ are therefore composed of gradients of convex functions that
sum up to the identity. In dimension 1, gradients of convex functions are
simply monotone maps (and so are composed of such maps). In higher
dimensions, a richer and more complicated structure emerges that will be
discussed later. Let us now consider the full problem with the constraints
that xi ∈ B and still assume that the ψi functions are smooth, then the
optimality conditions read as the existence of a p and a λi ≥ 0 such that
∇ψi(T iψ(x)) = p− λiT iψ(x) holds together with the complementary slackness
conditions: λi = 0 whenever T
i
ψ(x) lies in the interior of B.
4.3 A multivariate dominance result and equivalence
between efficiency and comonotonicity
Let us fix an allocation X = (X1, ..., Xp) ∈ A(X) such that X ∈ Bp a.s.,
and set γ0 = L(X) so that γ0 ∈ MB(m0). A family w := (w1, ..., wp) of C1
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functions is also given, each of them being strictly convex on B as in section
4.2. The first main result in the multivariate case is a dominance result, it
states that every allocation is dominated by a w-comonotone one and that
the dominance is strict if the initial allocation is not itself w-comonotone.
Theorem 4.5. Let γ0 = L(X) and w be as above. Then there exists some
γ ∈ M(m0) that is w-comonotone and dominates γ0. Moreover if γ0 is not
itself w-comonotone, then γ strictly dominates γ0.
The proof of this result will be given in section 6. Without giving details
at this point, let us explain the main arguments of the proof:
• The optimization problem (4.2) admits a unique solution Y with law
γ = L(Y), which is efficient and dominates γ0 = L(X).
• One then proves that γ is necessarily w-comonotone, by showing that
that w-comonotonicity is an optimality condition for (4.2). As usual in
convex programming, optimality conditions can be obtained by duality.
This leads to consider the problem
inf
{
E
( p∑
i=1
ψi(Xi)−iψi(
p∑
i=1
Xi)
)
: ψi − wi convex, ∀i
}
. (4.7)
By a careful study of (4.7), one can prove (but this is rather technical)
that γ is w-comonotone.
• It remains to show that γ strictly dominates γ0 unless γ0 is itself w-
comonotone. From lemma 2.2, it suffices to show that Y 6= X. But if
γ0 is not w-comonotone, then X cannot be optimal for (4.2) and thus
Y 6= X.
In terms of efficiency, the following thus holds:
Theorem 4.6. Let γ ∈MB(m0) and w be as before. Then
1. if γ is strictly w-comonotone, then it is efficient,
2. if γ is efficient, then it is w-comonotone for any w,
3. the closure for the weak-star topology of efficient allocations coincides
with the set of w-comonotone allocations (which is therefore indepen-
dent of w).
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Proof. Point 1 is a property already mentioned several times. Point 2 follows
from Theorem 4.5 and point 3 follows from points 1 and 2.
Note that by definition, if γ0 is strictly w-comonotone then the value
of problem (4.7) is zero. We shall also prove (see section 6) weak form of
the converse, namely that if the value of problem (4.7) is zero then γ0 is
w-comonotone. Therefore, the value of (4.7) as a function of the joint law
γ0 can be viewed as a numerical criterion for comonotonicity and thus for
efficiency. One can therefore, in principle, use on data this value as a test
statistic for efficiency.
4.4 Remarks on multivariate comonotonicity
Comparison with the notion of µ-comonotonicity of [20]. The notion
of multivariate comonotonicity considered in this paper is to be related to
the notion of µ-comonotonicity proposed by Ekeland, Galichon and Henry in
[20]. Recall the alternative characterization of comonotonicity given in the
univariate case in Proposition 2.5: X1 and X2 are comonotone if and only if
̺µ (X1 +X2) = ̺µ (X1)+ ̺µ (X2) for a measure µ that is sufficiently regular.
In dimension d, [20] have introduced the concept of µ-comonotonicity, based
on this idea: if µ is a probability measure on Rd which does not give positive
mass to small sets, two random vectors X1 and X2 on R
d are called µ-
comonotone if and only if
̺µ (X1 +X2) = ̺µ (X1) + ̺µ (X2) ,
where the (multivariate) maximum correlation functional (see e.g. [35] or
[20]) is defined by
̺µ (X) = sup
Y˜∼µ
E
(
X · Y˜
)
.
The authors of [20] show that X1 and X2 are µ-comonotone if and only if
there are two convex functions ψ1 and ψ2, and a random vector U ∼ µ such
that
X1 = ∇ψ1 (U) and X2 = ∇ψ2 (U)
holds almost surely. Therefore, the present notion of multivariate comono-
tonicity approximately consists of calling X1 and X2 comonotone if and only
if there is some measure µ such that X1 and X2 are µ-comonotone. There
are, however, qualifications to be added. Indeed, [20] require some regular-
ity on the measure µ. In the current setting, no regularity restrictions are
imposed on µ; but instead restrictions on the convexity of ψ1 and ψ2 have to
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be imposed to define the notion of w-comonotonicity before passing to the
limit. Although not equivalent, these two sets of restrictions originate from
the same concern: two random vectors are always optimally coupled with
very degenerate distributions, such as the distribution of constant vectors.
Therefore one needs to exclude these degenerate cases in order to avoid a
definition which would be void of substance. This is the very reason why the
strictly convex wi functions had to be introduced.
Comonotone allocations do not form a bounded set. In the scalar
case, comonotone allocations are parameterized by the set of nondecreasing
functions summing to the identity map. This set of functions is convex and
equilipschitz hence compact (up to adding constants summing up to zero).
This compactness is no longer true in higher dimensions (at least when w = 0
and we work on the whole space instead of B), and we believe that this is a
major structural difference with respect to the univariate case. For simplicity
assume that p = 2. As outlined in paragraph 4.2, a comonotone allocation
(X1, X2) of X is given by a pair of functions that are composed of gradients
of convex functions and sum up to the identity map. It is no longer true, in
dimension 2 that this set of maps is compact (up to constants). Indeed, let
us take n ∈ N∗, and quadratic ψ1 and ψ2 of the form
ψi(x) =
1
2
〈
S−1i x, x
〉
, i = 1, 2, x ∈ R2
with
S1 =
(
1
2
1
8
√
n
1
8
√
n
1
2n
)
, S2 =
(
1
2
−1
8
√
n
−1
8
√
n
1
2n
)
.
Then the corresponding map Tψ is linear, and T
1
ψ is given by the matrix
S1(S1 + S2)
−1 =
(
1
2
√
n
8
1
8
√
n
1
2
)
which is unbounded.
Comonotone allocations do not form a convex set. Another differ-
ence with the univariate case is that the set of maps of the form Tψ used to
define comonotonicity is not convex. To see this (again in the case p = d = 2),
it is enough to show that the set of pairs of 2× 2 matrices
K := (S1(S1+S2)
−1, S2(S1+S2)
−1), Si symmetric, positive definite, i = 1, 2}
is not convex. First let us remark that if (M1,M2) ∈ K then M1 and M2
have a positive determinant. Now for n ∈ N∗, and ε ∈ (0, 1) consider
S1 =
(
1
√
1− ε√
1− ε 1
)
, S2 =
(
1 −√1− ε
−√1− ε 1
)
,
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S ′1 =
(
1
√
n− ε√
n− ε n
)
, S ′2 =
(
1 −√n− ε
−√n− ε n
)
,
and define:
Mi = Si(S1 + S2)
−1, M ′i = S
′
i(S
′
1 + S
′
2)
−1, i = 1, 2.
If K was convex then the following matrix would have a positive determinant
M1 +M
′
1 =
(
1
√
1−ε
2
+
√
n−ε
2n√
1−ε
2
+
√
n−ε
2
1
)
,
which is obviously false for n large enough and ε small enough.
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have extended Landsberger and Meilijson’s comonotone
dominance principle to the multivariate case by introducing the variational
problem (4.2). We have then extended the univariate theory of efficient risk-
sharing to the case of several goods without perfect substitutability, and we
derived tractable implications. Two observations can be made at this point.
In the first place, this paper demonstrates the intrinsic difficulty of the multi-
variate case, as many features of the univariate case do not extend to higher
dimensions: computational ease, the compactness and convexity of efficient
risk-sharing allocations. Second, it illustrates the need for qualification in-
herent to the multivariate case. Contrary to the univariate case, the need to
quantify strict convexity as in this paper comes by no coincidence. In fact,
just as [20] impose regularity conditions on their “baseline measure” to avoid
degeneracy, we work with cones which are strictly included in the cone of
convex functions by quantifying the strict convexity of the functions used.
Getting back to our initial motivation, namely, finding testable implica-
tions of efficiency for the concave order, we already emphasized in paragraph
4.3 that one obtains as a byproduct of our variational approach a numerical
criterion that could in principle be used as a test statistic for comonotonic-
ity and thus for efficiency. We thus believe that the present work paves the
way for an interesting research agenda. First of all, an efficient algorithm
to decide whether a given allocation in the multivariate case is comonotone
or not remains to be discovered – we are currently investigating this point.
The convex nature of the underlying optimization problem helps, but the
constraints of problem (P∗) are delicate to handle numerically. Finally, this
work opens a research agenda on the empirical relevance of the multivari-
ate theory confronted to the data: do observations of realized allocations of
18
risk satisfy restrictions imposed by multivariate comonotonicity? As men-
tioned above, tests in the univariate case have been performed by [4] and [37]
and suggest rejection. But there is hope that in the more flexible setting of
multivariate risks, efficiency would be less strongly rejected.
6 Proofs
6.1 Proof of Lemma 2.2
Clearly 1 ⇒ 2 and 3 ⇒ 1 are obvious. To prove that 2 ⇒ 3, assume that 2
holds true. Let µ := L(X) and ν := L(Y ). These probability measures are
supported by some closed ball B, and the Cartier-Fell-Meyer theorem states
that there is a measurable family of conditional probability measures (Tx)x∈B
such that Tx has mean x and for every f continuous function, one has
E(f(Y )) =
∫
B
f(y)dν(y) =
∫
B
∫
B
f(y)dTx(y)dµ(x)
Since µ 6= ν, µ({x ∈ B : Tx 6= δx}) > 0, one deduces from Jensen’s
inequality that for every strictly convex function ϕ, E(ϕ(Y )) > E(ϕ(X)).
6.2 Proof of Lemma 4.1
For notational simplicity, assume that d = 1, p = 2, X takes values in [0, 2]
a.s. (so that m0 has support in [0, 2]) and γ is supported by [0, 1]
2. For every
n ∈ N∗ and k ∈ {0, ..., 2n+1}, set
Xn :=
2n+1∑
k=0
k
2n
1Ak,n, where Ak,n :=
{
ω ∈ Ω : X(ω) ∈
[ k
2n
,
k + 1
2n
[}
,
and
Ck,n :=
{
(y1, y2) ∈ [0, 1]2 : y1 + y2 ∈
[ k
2n
,
k + 1
2n
[}
.
Decompose the strip Ck,n into a partition by triangles
Ck,n =
⋃
k≤i+j≤k+1
T i,jk,n, T
i,j
k,n := Ck,n ∩
[ i
2n
,
i+ 1
2n
[
×
[ j
2n
,
j + 1
2n
[
.
Since ΠΣ(γ) = m0 one has:
P(Ak,n) = γ(Ck,n) =
∑
k≤i+j≤k+1
γ(T i,jk,n),
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and since (Ω,F ,P) is non-atomic, it follows from Lyapunov’s convexity the-
orem (see [29]) that there exists a partition of Ak,n into measurable subsets
Ai,jk,n such that
γ(T i,jk,n) = P(A
i,j
k,n), ∀(i, j) ∈ {0, ..., 2n} : k ≤ i+ j ≤ k + 1. (6.1)
Choose (y1, y2)
i,j
k,n ∈ T i,jk,n and define
Yn = (Y n1 , Y
n
2 ) :=
2n+1∑
k=0
∑
k≤i+j≤k+1
(y1, y2)
i,j
k,n1Ai,j
k,n
.
We may also choose inductively the partition of Ak,n by the A
i,j
k,n to be finer
and finer with respect to n. By construction, one obtains
max
(
‖Xn −X‖L∞, ‖Xn − Y n1 − Y n2 ‖L∞ , ‖Yn+1 −Yn‖L∞
)
≤ 1
2n
,
so that Yn is a Cauchy sequence in L∞, and thus converges to some Y =
(Y1, Y2). One then sees that Y1 + Y2 = X , and passing to the limit in (6.1),
it follows that L(Y) = γ.
6.3 Proofs and variational characterization for the mul-
tivariate dominance result
The proofs will very much rely on the linear programming problem:
(P∗) sup
γ∈K(γ0)
−
∫
Bp
p∑
i=1
wi(xi)dγ(x)
where K(γ0) consists of all γ ∈ MB(m0) such that for each i the marginal
γi dominates the corresponding marginal of γ0 i.e.:∫
Bp
ϕ(xi)dγ(x) ≤
∫
Bp
ϕ(xi)dγ0(x), ∀ϕ convex on B.
Problem (P∗) presents similarities with the problem solved in [22]. In the
optimal transport problem considered in [22], one minimizes the average of
some quadratic function over joint measures having prescribed marginals
whereas (P∗) includes dominance constraints on the marginals. To shorten
notations, define
η(x) := −
p∑
i=1
wi(xi), ∀x = (x1, ..., xp) ∈ Bp
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(P∗) is the dual problem (see the next lemma for details) of
(P) inf
{∫
Bp
( p∑
i=1
ϕi(xi)− ϕ0
( p∑
i=1
xi
))
dγ0(x), (ϕ0, ..., ϕp) ∈ E
}
,
where E consists of all families ϕ := (ϕ1, ...., ϕp, ϕ0) ∈ C(B)p × C(pB) such
that ϕi ∈ C and
p∑
i=1
ϕi(xi)− ϕ0
( p∑
i=1
xi
)
≥ −
p∑
i=1
wi(xi).
It will also be convenient to consider
(Q) inf
{
J(ψ) , ψ = (ψ1, ..., ψp) : each ψi is such that ψi − wi is convex
}
with
J(ψ) :=
∫
Bp
( p∑
i=1
ψi(xi)−iψi
( p∑
i=1
xi
))
dγ0(x).
Note that by construction J(ψ) ≥ 0 for every admissible ψ and J(ψ) = 0 if
and only if γ0 = γψ.
Lemma 6.1. The following holds
max(P∗) = inf(P) = inf(Q)−
∫
Bp
p∑
i=1
wi(xi)dγ0(x).
Proof. Let us write (P) in the form
inf
ϕ=(ϕ1,...,ϕp,ϕ0)∈C(B)p×C(pB)
F (Λϕ) +G(ϕ)
where Λ : C(B)p×C(pB)→ C(Bp) is the linear continuous map defined by
Λϕ(x) :=
p∑
i=1
ϕi(xi)− ϕ0
( p∑
i=1
xi
)
, ∀x = (x1, ..., xp) ∈ Bp,
and F , G are the convex lower semicontinuous (for the uniform norm) func-
tionals defined by
F (θ) =
{ ∫
Bp
θdγ0 if θ ≥ η
+∞ otherwise , ∀θ ∈ C(B
p)
G(ϕ) =
{
0 if (ϕ1, ..., ϕp) ∈ Cp
+∞ otherwise , ∀ϕ = (ϕ1, ..., ϕp, ϕ0) ∈ C(B)
p × C(pB).
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It is easy to see that the assumptions of Fenchel-Rockafellar’s duality theorem
(see for instance [18]) are satisfied and thus
inf(P) = max
γ∈M(Bp)
−F ∗(γ0 − γ)−G∗(Λ∗(γ − γ0)).
The adjoint of Λ, Λ∗ is easily computed as : M(Bp) → M(B)p ×M(pB)
(where M denotes the space of Radon measures):
Λ∗γ = (γ1, ..., γp,−ΠΣγ), ∀γ ∈M(Bp).
Direct computations give
F ∗(γ − γ0) =
{ − ∫
Bp
ηdγ if γ ≥ 0
+∞ otherwise
and
G∗(Λ∗(γ − γ0)) =
{
0 if γ ∈ K(γ0)
+∞ otherwise.
Therefore (P∗) is the dual of (P) in the usual sense of convex programming
and max(P∗) = inf(P). To prove that
inf(P) = inf(Q)−
∫
Bp
p∑
i=1
wi(xi)dγ0(x),
take ϕ ∈ E and ψi := wi + ϕi for i = 1, .., p, the constraint then reads as
p∑
i=1
ψi(xi) ≥ ϕ0
( p∑
i=1
xi
)
, ∀x ∈ Bp.
Now in (P), one needs to choose ϕ0 as large as possible without violating
this constraint. Thus the best ϕ0 given (ϕ1, ..., ϕp) is
ϕ0 = iψi,
which proves the desired identity.
Lemma 6.2. Let ψi be such that ψi−wi ∈ C for every i and g = (g1, ..., gp) ∈
Cp. Then
lim
δ→0+
1
δ
[J(ψ + δg)− J(ψ)] =
p∑
i=1
∫
B
gi(xi)d(γ
i
0 − γiψ)
=
∫
Bp
p∑
i=1
gi(xi)d(γ0 − γψ)(x).
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Proof. For δ > 0, one first gets that
1
δ
[J(ψ + δg)− J(ψ)] =
p∑
i=1
∫
B
gi(xi)d(γ
i
0)−∫
pB
1
δ
(
i(ψi + δgi)(x)−iψi(x)
)
dm0(x).
Note that the integrand in the second term is bounded since g is. Now
fix some (x1, ..., xp) ∈ Bp, and set x =
∑p
i=1 xi, yi := T
i
ψ(x) and y
δ
i :=
Tψ+δg(x). Since
∑p
i=1 yi =
∑p
i=1 y
δ
i = x, it comes as a direct consequence of
the definition of infimal convolutions that:
1
δ
(
i(ψi + δgi)(x)−iψi(x)
)
≤
p∑
i=1
gi(yi) (6.2)
and
1
δ
(
i(ψi + δgi)(x)−iψi(x)
)
≥
p∑
i=1
gi(y
δ
i ). (6.3)
Using the compactness of B and the strict convexity of ψi, it is easy to check
that yδi → yi as δ → 0+. Therefore, from (6.2) and (6.3) one has
lim
δ→0+
1
δ
(
i(ψi + δgi)(x)−iψi(x)
)
=
p∑
i=1
gi(T
i
ψ(x))
and this holds for every x ∈ pB. It then follows from Lebesgue’s dominated
convergence theorem that
lim
δ→0+
1
δ
[J(ψ + δg)− J(ψ)] =
p∑
i=1
∫
B
gi(xi)d(γ
i
0)−
p∑
i=1
∫
pB
gi(T
i
ψ(x))dm0(x)
=
p∑
i=1
∫
B
gi(xi)d(γ
i
0 − γiψ) =
∫
Bp
p∑
i=1
gi(xi)d(γ0 − γψ)(x).
It follows from Lemma 6.2 that, if ψ solves (Q), then γψ dominates γ0.
Hence, if one knew that (Q) possesses solutions, the existence of an ω-strictly
comonotone allocation dominating γ0 would directly follow. Unfortunately,
it is not necessarily the case that the infimum in (Q) is attained – or at least
we haven’t been able to prove without additional conditions. The difficulty
here comes from the fact that minimizing sequences need not be bounded (see
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paragraph 4.4). It may be the case that additional regularity assumptions
on γ0 would guarantee existence. In the present paper no such assumption is
made, and a different path is chosen to overcome the difficulty by an appeal
to Ekeland’s variational principle.
Lemma 6.3. Letting ε > 0, there exists ψε admissible for (Q) such that
1. J(ψε) ≤ inf(Q) + ε
2.
lim sup
ε→0+
∫
Bp
p∑
i=1
ϕi(xi)d(γψε − γ0) ≤ 0
for every (ϕ1, ..., ϕp) ∈ Cp
3.
lim inf
ε→0+
∫
Bp
p∑
i=1
ϕεi (xi)d(γψε − γ0) ≥ 0
for ϕεi = ψi,ε − wi (these are convex functions by definition).
Proof. For ε > 0, let fε be admissible for (Q) and such that
J(fε) ≤ inf(Q) + ε.
Let then kε > 0 be such that
lim
ε→0+
εkε[1 + ‖fε‖] = 0 (for instance kε = 1
ε1/2(1 + ‖fε‖)). (6.4)
It follows from Ekeland’s variational principle (see [17] and [5]) that for every
ε > 0, there is some ψε admissible for (Q) such that
‖ψε − fε‖ ≤ 1
kε
, J(ψε) ≤ J(fε) ≤ inf(Q) + ε, (6.5)
where ‖h‖ stands for the sum of the uniform norms of the hi functions, and
J(ψ) ≥ J(ψε)− kεε‖ψ − ψε‖, ∀ψ = (ψ1, ..., ψp) : ψi − wi ∈ C, ∀i. (6.6)
Taking ψ = ψε+ δϕ with δ > 0 and ϕ ∈ Cp in (6.6), dividing by δ and letting
δ → 0+, one thus gets by the virtues of Lemma 6.2
∫
Bp
p∑
i=1
ϕi(xi)d(γ0 − γψε) ≥ −kεε‖ϕ‖. (6.7)
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Using (6.4) and letting ε→ 0+ yields
lim sup
ε→0+
∫
Bp
p∑
i=1
ϕi(xi)d(γψε − γ0) ≤ 0 (6.8)
for every (ϕ1, ..., ϕp) ∈ Cp. To prove the last assertion of the lemma, write
ψε = ϕ
ε+w with ϕε ∈ Cp. Then for δ ∈ (0, 1) one has ψε−δϕε = (1−δ)ϕε+w,
and then (6.6) can be applied to ψε − δϕε, leading to
1
δ
[J(ψε − δϕε)− J(ψε)] ≥ −kεε‖ϕε‖,
which, letting δ → 0+ and using the same argument as in lemma 6.2, leads
in turn to ∫
Bp
p∑
i=1
ϕεi (xi)d(γψε − γ0) ≥ −kεε‖ϕε‖.
By (6.4) and (6.5), it follows that
kεε‖ϕε‖ ≤ kεε(‖w‖+‖ψε−fε‖+‖fε‖) ≤ kεε‖w‖+ε+kεε‖fε‖ → 0 as ε→ 0+,
which enables us to conclude that
lim inf
ε→0+
∫
Bp
p∑
i=1
ϕεi (xi)d(γψε − γ0) ≥ 0. (6.9)
Lemma 6.4. Let ψε be as in lemma 6.3 and set γε := γψε then up to some
subsequence, γε weakly star converges to some γ (w-comonotone by construc-
tion) such that γ ∈MB(m0) and γ dominates γ0. Moreover γ solves (P∗).
Proof. By the Banach-Alaoglu-Bourbaki theorem, one may indeed assume
that γε weakly star converges to some γ. Obviously, γ is w-comonotone and
ΠΣγ = ΠΣγ0 = m0, hence γ ∈ MB(m0). The fact that γ dominates γ0 is
obtained by letting ε→ 0+ in (6.8). It remains to prove that γ solves (P∗).
Defining ϕε := ψε − w as in Lemma 6.3, one has
J(ψε) =
∫
Bp
p∑
i=1
ϕεi (xi)d(γ0 − γε) +
∫
Bp
ηd(γε − γ0)→ inf(Q) as ε→ 0+.
By (6.9), passing to the limit thus yields
inf(Q) ≤
∫
Bp
ηd(γ − γ0),
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which, combined with Lemma 6.1, gives∫
Bp
ηdγ ≥ inf(Q) +
∫
Bp
ηdγ0 = max(P∗).
Lemma 6.5. Let γ be as in lemma 6.4. Then:
1. if γ0 solves (P∗) then γ0 is w-comonotone,
2. γ strictly dominates γ0 unless γ0 is itself w-comonotone.
Proof. If γ0 solves (P∗), it follows from Lemma 6.1 that inf(Q) = 0. For any
minimizing sequence ψε (not necessarily the one constructed in Lemma 6.3)
of (Q), the following holds:
0 = lim
ε→0+
J(ψε) = lim
ε→0+
∫
Bp
( p∑
i=1
ψi,ε(xi)−iψi,ε
( p∑
i=1
xi
))
dγ0(x)
= lim
ε→0+
∫
Bp
( p∑
i=1
ψi,ε(xi)−
p∑
i=1
ψi,ε
(
T iψε
( p∑
i=1
xi
)))
dγ0(x).
By a density argument, one may consider ψε a minimizing sequence such
that each ψε belongs to C
1(B). Fix (x1, ..., xp) and set x :=
∑p
i=1 xi. Then
yε := Tψε(x) can be characterized by the fact that there is a vector p ∈ Rd
and a vector (λi) of nonnegative weights such that
∇ψi,ε(yεi ) = p− λiyεi , λi = 0 if yεi /∈ ∂B,
p∑
i=1
yεi = x. (6.10)
On the other hand, since wi is strictly convex and ψi,ε − wi ∈ C, it follows
that for any a and b in B2,
ψi,ε(b)− ψi,ε(a) ≥ ∇ψi,ε(a) · (b− a) + θi(|b− a|) (6.11)
where function θi is defined by
θi(t) := inf{wi(b)− wi(a)−∇wi(a) · (b− a), (a, b) ∈ B2, |a− b| ≥ t}
for any t ∈ [0, diam(B)]. Function θi (the modulus of strict convexity of
wi) is a nondecreasing function such that θi(0) = 0 and θi(t) > 0 for t > 0.
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Combining (6.10) and (6.11) yields
p∑
i=1
ψi,ε(xi)−
p∑
i=1
ψi,ε(y
ε
i ) ≥
p∑
i=1
∇ψi,ε(yεi ) · (xi − yεi ) +
p∑
i=1
θi(|xi − yεi |)
= p ·
p∑
i=1
(xi − yεi )−
p∑
i=1
λiy
ε
i (xi − yεi ) +
p∑
i=1
θi(|xi − yεi |)
≥
p∑
i=1
θi(|xi − yεi |).
Hence the fact that J(ψε)→ 0 as ε→ 0+ implies
lim
ε→0+
∫
Bp
p∑
i=1
θi(|xi − T iψε(
∑
j
xj)|)dγ0(x) = 0
so that
Tψε(
∑
j
xj)− x→ 0 as ε→ 0+ for γ0-a.e. x.
Therefore, by Lebesgue’s dominated convergence theorem,∫
Bp
f(x)dγ0(x) = lim
ε→0+
∫
Bp
f(Tψε(
∑
j
xj))dγ0(x) = lim
ε→0+
∫
pB
f(Tψε(x))dm0(x)
= lim
ε→0+
∫
Bp
fdγψε
holds for all f ∈ C(Bp). Hence, γψε weakly star converges to γ0 which proves
that γ0 is w-comonotone and Point 1 is proven. We now prove Point 2. If
γ0 is not w-comonotone then by Point 1, it does not solve (P∗) and thus∫
ηd(γ − γ0) > 0 so that
∫
Bp
p∑
i=1
wi(xi)dγ <
∫
Bp
p∑
i=1
wi(xi)dγ0
hence γ strictly dominates γ0. This completes the proof.
6.4 Proof of Theorem 3.1
Let γ0 := L(X) = L(X1, ..., Xp) and consider again the minimization problem
(P∗). It follows from Lemma 6.4 that there exists a w-comonotone solution
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γ to (P∗). By construction, γ dominates γ0, and by the definition of w-
comontonicity, there is a sequence γn of w-strictly comonotone allocations
that weakly star converges to γ. Lemma 4.1 allows to write γn = L(Yn)
for some Yn ∈ A(X) which is obviously comonotone in the univariate sense
according to Definition 2.4. Since Yn is bounded in L
∞ and each Yn is a 1-
Lipschitz function of X , one may assume that Yn converges uniformly (up to
a subsequence) to some Y ∈ A(X). It is obvious that Y is also comonotone
and that γ = L(Y), hence Y dominates X. The strict dominance assertion
follows from Lemma 6.5.
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